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Introduction 
While the internal working structure in parliaments is of high interest to all students of 
legislative affairs, parliaments are often a black box in this regard. Social network analysis 
has already shown its suitability to uncover such hidden structures in other domains such as 
organizational research (Tichy et al. 1979). Contrary to these advantageous external 
preconditions the study of networks in legislatures is still a recent development that has (apart 
from a few early studies such as Patterson (1959)) only begun to unfold during the last decade 
(e.g. Fowler, 2006; Kirkland, 2011). The fact that most of these studies focus on the US 
legislature in the form of bill-cosponsorship analyses means that nearly all we know stems 
from a single presidential system and from data on the legislative process itself. In this paper, 
we expand on research on legislative networks to the supranational setting of the European 
Union and non-legislative activities, which are another relevant aspect of parliamentary work 
(see Russo, 2011:292). We use oral questions (OQs) from the European Parliament (EP) for 




Apart from the interest in exploring an under-researched field, our study taps into several 
other motivations. First, an important function of parliaments is executive oversight and 
questions are one way to achieve this (Martin, 2012). Using them to map out the connections 
among legislators can give us a clearer image of how exactly this function is (collectively) 
exercised (see Martin, 2011:4). Second, work from presidential (TamCho and Fowler, 2010) 
and parliamentary systems (Metz and Jäckle, 2016) has uncovered quite different networks – 
a “small world” of partisan, yet densely interconnected legislators in the former versus 
strongly parochial parties and a separation of government and opposition in the latter. While 
these differences can be expected given the different systems of government, analyzing a 
supranational setting such as the EP can help to gain a deeper understanding of the role of 
systemic features on network structure. Of particular interest in this regard is the question 
whether the structuring principle of the OQ-network within the EP is the countries or the 
parliamentary groups. Finally, inferring connections among legislators is helpful for getting 
an insight into the inner processes and organizations of parliamentary parties which are 
difficult to observe otherwise. Certainly, looking at OQs is only one of many ways to 
approach such questions. Yet, when legislators ask a question together, this directly implies 
some form social contact between them. The network derived from these relations is then a 
handy feature to leverage when we want to open as many windows as possible to expose 
internal structures otherwise not immediately obvious to us.  
How to capture social relations among legislators 
Legislative networks can either be constructed from direct or indirect measures. Most early 
studies relied on questionnaires asking legislators directly about their connections, e.g. in 
terms of friendship (Patterson, 1959) which made these networks easy to interpret. Yet, all 
sorts of problems associated with surveys (e.g. low response rates or self-selection bias) may 
undermine the results of this approach. Therefore, the greater part of recent studies uses 
 
 
indirect measures originating from the regular activities of a parliament to infer ties between 
its members, as these measures are more reliable, objective and able to depict the network of a 
whole organization without losing possible knots and ties due to refusals. Recent works have 
derived legislative networks from three different sources: joint cosponsorship of bills, joint 
committee membership and joint roll-call votes. In this article we propose a fourth possibility 
– jointly asked parliamentary questions. The flipside of the indirect approach is that it requires 
interpretation of what a connection means.  
Existing approaches: cosponsorship, roll-call and committee networks 
For cosponsorship the argument runs as follows: sponsoring a bill together with others 
expresses a “joint public stance[.] on policy” (Aleman and Calvo, 2013:357), revealing 
legislators’ preferences. Two potential target groups can be identified: the “matching” or 
“position-taking” perspective argues that constituents form the main audience for 
cosponsoring, thus emphasizing electoral incentives (Koger, 2003; Campbell, 1982). The 
“signaling” or “legislative connection” perspective (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Wilson and 
Young, 1997) instead argues that cosponsorship is mainly directed at fellow legislators in 
order to facilitate the passage of bills promoting one’s own policy ideals. By connecting to 
others, parliamentarians build reputation and transmit information as well as support or 
expertise to key players in the legislature (Aleman and Calvo, 2013:358). Given that evidence 
has been offered for both perspectives, cosponsorship can be the result of multiple motives 
and will probably serve both goals to some extent. As such, while it does imply cooperation, 
this behavior should best be interpreted in a technical sense as “working together” unless 
other data suggest a more precise interpretation. Irrespective of the different emphasis, both 
perspectives agree that (co)sponsorship is less dominated by partisan effects than roll-call 
votes (Highton and Rocca, 2005) so that the revealed preferences are quite reliable, which is 
especially helpful when parties (and their associated effects on legislators’ behavior) are 
 
 
strong (see Aleman and Calvo, 2013:360). The third most common way to construct 
legislative networks is to use data on joint membership in committees and sub-committees 
(Porter et al., 2005). With committees being at a pivotal position in the policy-making process 
in many legislatures, ties between them can be informative with respect to the specialization 
of legislators and the overall informal structure of the legislative process. Regarding the 
resulting networks, a study by Onnela et al. (2012:7) has shown that networks based on voting 
and cosponsorship are relatively close to each other structurally while committee networks 
differ from both – at least for the US Congress. For the EP, Patz (2013; 2015) has proven that 
a committee-based approach works well to identify which of the (currently) 23 committees 
are central and well connected. Yet, it does not disclose much about how work in the 
parliament is structured. For this, it makes more sense to concentrate on actions of the MEPs 
than on their affiliation to committees. With cosponsoring not being possible in the EP 
(except for amendments in committees, see below) and roll-call votes being better suited for 
testing whether certain network structures apart from the party and nationality shape the 
decisions, we require another option to derive a network that describes actual cooperation 
patterns in the EP. We argue that parliamentary questions (PQs) asked collectively are useful 
in that regard. 
 
Our approach: networks derived from parliamentary questions 
In order to use PQs as a basis for constructing legislative networks, two questions have to be 
answered: what roles do PQs play in the legislature and what motivates delegates to file them, 





The role of parliamentary questions. 
PQs are usually seen as a means of extracting information from the government for oversight, 
linking them to the parliamentary control function (Martin 2013:3). However, most studies 
also highlight that PQs have limitations in that regard, partly because the usefulness of 
questioning procedures varies cross-nationally and partly because majority legislators in 
parliamentary systems are in a principal-agent relation to government, the connection has a 
strongly cooperative character (Martin, 2012:3; Wiberg, 1995:182). Others argue that 
oversight alone is too narrow as a perspective since the role of PQs is difficult to separate 
from the parliamentary function of publicity (Siefken 2010:33). From this vantage point, 
questions may generate a deterring “threat potential” (Steffani cited in Siefken, 2010:34; see 
also DeDios, 2012) against executive misconduct because they can extract and publicize any 
kind of information and demand justification at any time (Siefken, 2010: 32-34). 
Consequently, PQs allow especially the opposition to raise public awareness for alleged 
government failures. Therefore, it is no surprise that the opposition usually asks the majority 
of questions (Siefken, 2010; Rasch, 2009). 
Motivations for asking parliamentary questions.  
Martin (2012:7f) highlights two main types of motives for asking PQs: government oversight 
and building up personal reputation. Legislators may focus on holding the government 
accountable, possibly through public confrontation between governing and opposing parties 
(Martin, 2012:8; Rasch, 2009:207; see DeDios 2012 for a description of PQs as an 
accountability game). Related motives include bureaucratic accountability, clarification of 
government or party policy positions (both by opposition and intra-party wings) or (for a 
governing party) monitoring the behavior of a coalition partner (Martin, 2013:12f). At the 
European level, it has been shown that parties who are the opposition in their national 
parliaments use PQs as instruments of oversight in two ways: first, since they do not have 
 
 
access to executive oversight at European level, they use these questions to monitor the 
behavior of the Commission (Proksch and Slapin, 2011:70). Second, they use questions as a 
“fire alarm” oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) to alert the commission about 
failures of their own national governments to enact EU law (Jensen et al., 2013:270f). 
Additionally, gathering information (reflecting one’s committee specialization) and bothering 
the Commission (for Eurosceptics) can also be seen as kinds of oversight motives (Proksch 
and Slapin, 2011:70). The second type of motive, building a personal reputation, is in line 
with Wiberg’s idea (1995:181-183) that self-promotion and re-election may be more 
important motives than oversight. If seen that way, PQs might serve as instruments with 
which to send signals to one’s constituency to secure a personal vote (Rasch, 2009; Blidook 
and Kerby, 2012). Party control of the question process reduces this tendency (Rasch, 
2011:391). Yet, signaling may also be directed at other addressees rather than constituencies. 
For example, Bailer (2012:48f) found few questions on local matters in Switzerland. Instead, 
factors indicating that legislators were “career- and nationally oriented” (and thus, 
presumably, party-focused) predicted question frequency (Bailer, 2012:51f). Surveys of 
German and Norwegian legislators confirm that selfish reasons often play a role when asking 
PQs (Kepplinger, 2008; Rasch, 2011). Much of the process seems to build upon the role of 
media as a supplier of questions and outlet for answers (Kepplinger, 2008:313).1 In a nutshell, 
legislators may draw on the parliament’s publicity function by asking questions to raise 
awareness, shape public opinion about the situation and signal to both their constituencies and 
parties that they are managing it (Kepplinger, 2008:306-309). Consistent with this idea, 
candidate list position as a proxy for electoral safety has been found to govern questioning 
behavior among Romanian legislators in the European Parliament (Chiru and Dimulescu, 
2011).  
                                                            
1 In a comparison of news coverage of parliamentary questions for the Netherlands, France and Germany, van 
Santen and colleagues (2015:57) found that media attention for oral questions was largest when the topic of the 
question had already made it to the headlines before.  
 
 
The only theorizing of why legislators would ask a question together is from Metz and Jäckle 
(2016). They draw on both a signaling perspective and on the notion of personal expertise, 
arguing that legislators in the German Bundestag who support others’ minor interpellations 
might do so to signal personal support and show how well connected they are in the party. 
Additionally, connections could stem from professional support from experts working 
together to enhance the quality of the question. Compared to cosponsorship networks 
depicting the internal structure of the parliament that is relevant for the legislative process, 
structures derived from PQs would thus be different to interpret. With PQs being first and 
foremost a routine for parliamentary control, a network based on them can be seen as a kind 
of “oversight coalition”. Yet, both network types (cosponsorship and PQ-networks)also have 
the two related notions of signaling to one’s constituency and one’s party in common. 
State of research on legislative networks 
Legislative network studies in the United States 
Whereas earlier research on connections between US state legislators, e.g. in terms of 
friendship or respect, were based on surveys, Fowler (2006) showed for the first time that – 
instead of direct questionnaires – bill cosponsorship could also be employed to derive support 
networks among legislators. Using data for both the US House and Senate for 1973-2004, he 
showed that a measure of the frequency of cosponsoring and the number of supporters 
predicted legislative influence and roll-call vote choice.  
One area of research has focused on legislative networks as independent variables, asking 
how they shape legislative behavior. Here, a solid finding is that one’s connection to others 
affects voting behavior (see Masket, 2008; Kirkland, 2011). Furthermore Victor and Ringe 
show that caucuses are not an alternative pathway for junior legislators to gain influence but 
“a social structure that replicates the formal institutional organization by allowing structurally 
 
 
disadvantaged members to connect to their colleagues in formal positions of power and 
influence” (Victor and Ringe, 2009:762). At an aggregate level, the degree to which the 
cosponsorship network in the US Congress fits a “small world” network (Watts and Strogatz, 
1998) predicts its ability to pass important legislation (TamCho and Fowler, 2010).  
Others construe legislative networks as dependent variables. Here, studies have identified 
several factors that drive the formation of a tie: ideological distance, the proximity of 
legislators’ districts, similar social attributes, common ties to a third legislator (Bratton and 
Rouse, 2011), shared religious denominations, gender (Gross and Sahlizi, 2009, cited in 
Kirkland, 2011:888), the tendency to reciprocate sponsoring (Burkett and Skvoretz, 2005:23f) 
as well as institutional constraints such as term limits (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al., 2006) or 
legislature size (Kirkland, 2014). Additionally, connections between the lower and upper 
houses in US state legislatures are fostered by factors such as similar party, overlapping 
districts, leadership position, and a general norm of reciprocity (Kirkland and Williams, 
2014). At an aggregate level, studies have mapped out the development of network 
modularity as a measure of polarization (Zhang et al. 2008) and shown that rising public 
approval ratings in the long term decrease path length and increase clustering (and 
modularity) in the US Congress (Kirkland and Gross 2014).2 
Work on legislative networks outside the US 
So far, few studies have analyzed legislative networks in a non-US context. Recently, Aleman 
and Calvo (2013) examined the determinants of legislative networks (derived from bill 
initiation data) in the Argentinian (1995-1997) and Chilean (2002-2006) congresses and thus 
two further presidential systems. They found that “[t]he likelihood of two legislators 
developing policy ties is significantly higher if these legislators are from the same party, from 
contiguous electoral districts or have been assigned to work on the same congressional 
                                                            
2 The Physics and Mathematics community has joined research on legislative networks, although here the focus 
rests more on the aggregate network (e.g. Porter et al., 2005; Onnela et al., 2012). 
 
 
committee” (Aleman and Calvo, 2013: 372). Briatte (2015) constructed cosponsorship 
networks for no less than 29 parliamentary chambers in 21 countries. His work particularly 
illustrates the huge potential of interactive visualizations of network structures. Metz and 
Jäckle (2016) looked at support networks for minor interpellations (a form of parliamentary 
question) in the German parliament. Since interpellations are an instrument of oversight, their 
network only covers opposition parties, yet it reveals that parties differ markedly in their 
internal structure. While institutional features dominate for Social Democrats and the Green 
Party (e.g. star-like structure around group leadership for Social Democrats), the network 
within the socialist party “Linke” is partly organized around policy fields and partly around 
factions based on regional origin and gender. 
So far, network studies on the EP always focused on certain committees or policy areas, 
deriving their networks either from surveys amongst the legislators (Ringe et al., 2013) or 
from cosponsored amendments within single committees (Briatte, 2015). The only network 
analysis that gives a picture of the complete EP is an article by Mendonca et al. (2015) which 
uses roll-call votes. Nevertheless, the paper’s focus is on methodological questions (namely, 
on community detection in signed complex networks) and it uses the EP voting data only as a 
case study to demonstrate the approach which makes it less central from a political-scientific 
point of view. 
Data and network construction 
Parliamentary questions in the European Parliament 
Members of the European Parliament may ask three different types of PQs: written questions 
(WQs), questions for oral answers or oral questions (OQs), and questions in the parliament’s 
question hour. While WQs form the largest bulk of material, we chose to concentrate on OQs 
only because they are a forum in which MEPs cooperate extensively (69.2 per cent of them 
 
 
are asked by more than one person, see below), making it most likely to observe their 
underlying organization. OQs can be submitted by either a committee, a party group, or 40 
MEPs. They can be directed at both the Commission and the Council and are submitted in 
written form to the President of the Parliament who refers them to the Conference of 
Presidents that decides on whether the question is placed on the agenda. If an OQ is included, 
the MEPs asking the question may give a five-minute speech on it after which a member of 
the institution concerned responds.  
Data collection and network extraction 
We collected all 1050 OQs for the 7th EP of 2009-2014 from the Parliament’s website and 
extracted the names of all MEPs who were listed as authors, the question title, date, addressee, 
and the affiliation given for authors (i.e. whether the question was registered from one or 
multiple committees and/or party groups). We then collected personal information for all 
MEPs, including country of origin, parliamentary group affiliation, gender and freshman 
status in the EP. The network was extracted by going through each question and connecting 
MEPs that appeared together on a question. We also recorded how often a pair of legislators 
asked a question together. While for some parliaments the sequence of names on a question 
may be indicative of different roles (e.g. in Germany, the first name on a minor interpellation 
is the legislator initiating the interpellation while all others rank as supporters; see Siefken, 
2010:28), the sequence of names on OQs in the EP does not follow any clear pattern (personal 
communication with the bureau of information of the EP in Berlin). We therefore treated the 
connections as undirected, meaning that all MEPs who have asked a question together are 
regarded as interconnected. While this approach readily yields a networked structure, one 
caveat is, of course, that we can only “see” MEPs whose names are on the question. 
Therefore, both within and between e.g. EPGs, more people may be involved in the necessary 
 
 
coordination to ask a question. Yet, as their names are not on the final product, these 
supporting structures remain invisible to us. 
Hypotheses 
While the main focus of this article is descriptive, i.e. to present a network of the MEPs and 
investigate its patterns, two hypotheses regarding the peculiarities of the network may be 
derived:  
Metz and Jäckle (2016) have found that parties play a major role in structuring the network of 
interpellations in the German parliamentary system. However, in presidential systems, where 
parties are weaker, networks seem to approach a so called “small world” that encompassed 
most legislators (TamCho and Fowler, 2010; Fowler, 2006a). Taking the EP as an 
intermediate to both extremes suggests that the party should be less of a defining feature of 
the network than in parliamentary systems, although it will certainly not disappear. This can 
be expressed in two hypotheses: 
H1a: Members of one and the same parliamentary group ask more OQs together than 
with members of other parliamentary groups.  
H1b: We find more cooperation between members of different parliamentary groups 
when asking OQs than in parliamentary systems such as Germany.  
Also, regional origin has been found to matter for parliamentary as well as presidential 
systems (Metz and Jäckle, 2016; Fowler, 2006a:469). Given the fact that the EU is far from 
being as integrated as nation states like Germany or the USA, we assume nationality to be the 
second most important driving factor for tie formation. This yields our second hypothesis: 
H2: MEPs from the same country issue more questions together than with colleagues 




Description of questions 
OQs are mostly a partisan matter: of the 1050 OQs, 68.1 per cent were launched by one or 
more parliamentary group(s) (but not by a committee) while only 27.6 per cent came from a 
committee (but not from any of the groups); around four per cent (42) were filed by neither, 
just three questions were supported by at least one committee and at least one group together. 
ALDE has participated in most questions (213) and EFD in fewest (44) although in terms of 
group size (see figures 1 and 2a), GUENGL appears most active (4.09 questions per MEP vs. 
0.64 for EPP). The number of names on a question differs markedly across groups (see figure 
2b). Putting these numbers into the context of group size shows that smaller groups like 
GUENGL or ALDE generally enjoy a higher share of legislators supporting a question while 
within the EPP or SD, support is low. The only exception seems to be ECR where on average 
only 2.8 per cent of legislators support an OQ. 





                                                            
3 The network-analysis in this section uses standard network statistics such as degree, density or centrality 
measures. We explain them in short in turn when we use them. A more detailed description of these network 
statistics can be found in Newman (2010).    
 
 
Figure 2: (A) Number of oral questions. (B) Mean number of signees by parliamentary 
group. 
 
At the individual level, variation in terms of activity is large and skewed with most legislators 
rather uninvolved in asking questions while a few others dominate the process: of all the 857 
legislators in our dataset who sat in the EP between 2009 and 2014 (including those leaving 
early and their successors), 132 have never asked an OQ. Of the 725 who in some form 
participated in a question, 47.8 per cent have supported between one and five questions (i.e. 
on average not more than one OQ a year). On the other end of the scale, a single legislator, 
Baroness Sarah Ludford (ALDE) has participated in as many as 89 questions, followed by 
another two ALDE legislators: Sophia in’t Veld and Sonia Alfano with 86 and 85 questions, 
respectively. For the questions initiated by committees, the Committee on Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety has been most active with 45 questions (15.4 per cent of all 
questions initiated by a committee), while only two oral questions were registered from the 




three quarters (782, i.e. 74.5 per cent) of questions were directed at the Commission, the 
remaining 268 were aimed at the Council.4  
Figure 3: Network of joint oral questions among parliamentary groups. 
When asking questions, committees rarely cooperate. Political groups, on the other hand, are 
somewhat more cooperative. After all, 10.3 per cent of those OQs asked by political groups 
(which may involve parliamentarians signing onto the question) were asked by at least two 
groups together, with SD, ALDE, and EPP participating most often in joint questions. When 
cooperating, political groups show no clear pattern of ideological sorting (see figure 3): while 
most cooperations were between ALDE and EPP (they supported a question together in 44 
                                                            
4 However, many of these appear to be in fact “duplicates”, given that for 82.1 per cent of all questions aimed at 
the Council, we find one with an identical title aimed at the Commission. 
 
 
instances), nearly as many were between SD and EPP, ALDE and SD or Green/EFA and 
ALDE.  
Global description of network 
At a global level, the network of legislators consists of 725 nodes, nearly all of which form a 
single giant component, i.e. they are connected directly or via other legislators. Only five 
legislators have no connections to others since they have only asked questions alone. For the 
remaining analysis, we will exclude these five nodes. In terms of edges, the network appears 
comparatively densely knit, with 19.2 per cent of all possible edges present. This is reflected 
in a mean degree of 138.2 which states that on average, a legislator is connected to 138.2 
other persons in the EP via joint questions. Yet, this value masks some variation. While the 
modal category (including 72 legislators) has connections to 41-50 others, five legislators 
have just a single connection, making them highly marginal in the network.5 On the other 
side, the three persons with the highest degree are Mariya Gabriel (EPP, 427 connections), 
Antonija Parwanowa (EPP, 413), and Erminia Mazzoni (ALDE, 392). The high average 
degree of most legislators is also visible in a comparatively short diameter (= longest shortest 
path between two vertices) of five. 
Legislators in the EP are connected by a total of 49,751 edges. Since we know how often two 
persons have signed an OQ together, we can use this measure as a rough approximation of 
their cooperation. The bulk of edges is comparatively weak with 55.0 per cent of edges 
coming from just a single instance of co-support and another 29.8 per cent stemming from 
two instances in which two legislators have signed a question together (average edge weight 
is 1.9). Yet, some edges testify to quite stable relationships: for example Sophie in’t Veld and 
Baroness Sarah Ludford have co-supported 64 OQs.  
                                                            
5 Among them is Nigel Farage (EFD). 
 
 
The degrees reported above do not take into account that edges may stem from single or 
multiple instances of asking a question together. If we add up the edge weights for a legislator 
A (= number of times A supported a question together with B, C, D…) and divide the value 
by her degree (= number of other legislators connected to A), we get an impression of how 
strong her contacts are on average. Here, most legislators have fairly low values suggesting 
generally loose interconnections (the mean across all legislators is 1.74), although some 
obviously have quite stable cooperations (Jens Rohde (ALDE) has the maximum average of 
8.8 co-supports per edge). However, mean and standard deviation of weights across incident 
edges are strongly correlated (r = 0.879), suggesting that individuals with higher average edge 
weight do not cooperate evenly across neighbors but rather concentrate on a few strong 
connections.  
In order to make the dense network visually easier to interpret, we temporarily ignore edges 
with a weight of four or less (meaning that edges only remain when two legislators signed 
onto a question together at least five times, i.e. on average at least once a year). Doing so, 293 
nodes remain connected to at least one other node (including a giant component and six small 
components consisting of two or three nodes) while the rest becomes isolated. Omitting 
isolates from the plot, we find that the network already shows the strong role of parliamentary 
groups visually (see figure 4). As expected, most ties run between members of the same 
parliamentary group. Between members of different parliamentary groups the clustering 
seems to be tighter among EPP and ALDE, although it is difficult to tell with so many edges 
discarded (we will return to this below). There is also a tendency of the nodes to line up along 
an ideological left-right axis: the reduced graph proceeds from mostly EPP (and some 
interspersed EFD) legislators on the left hand side of the plot across a cluster of ALDE 
legislators, from which most SD legislators can be reached in the upper right quadrant to the 
clusters of Green/EFA and GUENGL in the lower right. ECR legislators are widely absent. In 
 
 
line with the apparent role of groups no unaffiliated legislators are included in this core 
network. 
Figure 4: Complete network (only edges with a weight of at least 5 are presented) 
  
Legislators’ position in the network 
Who are the most important actors in the network? Two widely used ways to measure 
importance in network analysis are closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. Both 
build on the notion of distance and connections. Because networks do not occupy a space with 
 
 
an associated metric (such as e.g. physical or ideological proximity), distance is captured as 
the number of “hops” along edges necessary to reach another node. Since one can in principle 
take many routes along the edges, distance is always measured along the shortest route. 
Closeness centrality therefore calculates for a given node the average distance to all other 
nodes and ranks those as most central who are on average closest to all other nodes, 
suggesting that the ability to reach others via social connections is an important property. 
Betweenness centrality on the other hand, looks at all the shortest paths between all possible 
pairs of nodes and assesses how often a given node is positioned on these connections, 
ranking those as most important who come to occupy such a position as a potential mediator 
most often (assuming that they will more often take part in the exchanges running along 
edges). Table 1 lists the five most central legislators according to both centrality measures.6 
Regarding closeness, three of the five most central legislators come from ALDE, testifying to 
the central position of the group which we have already seen in the plot above. For 
betweenness, Raül Romeva i Rueda (Green/EFA) has by far the highest value. The 
distribution is strongly skewed with most legislators occupying few to no important mediating 
positions. Furthermore, ALDE does not occupy such a prominent place anymore as the five 
legislators with the highest betweenness come from EPP and Green/EFA. 
Table 1: The five most central legislators  
Closeness centrality Betweenness centrality 
Mariya Gabriel (EPP, 22 questions) Raül Romeva i Rueda (Green/EFA, 69 questions) 
Sonia Alfano (ALDE, 85 questions) Mariya Gabriel (EPP, 22 questions) 
Erminia Mazzoni (EPP, 34 questions) Sonia Alfano (ALDE, 85 questions) 
Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE, 60 questions) Rui Tavares (Green/EFA, 61questions) 
Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE, 71 questions) Erminia Mazzoni (EPP, 34 questions) 
 
                                                            




The parliamentary groups 
In this section we examine the different parliamentary groups, how they are structured 
internally and how they relate to each other. To this end, we extracted the networks induced 
by all its members for each parliamentary group, i.e. each network contains all edges running 
among group members (but not those pointing to members of other groups). 
Groups differ in absolute size and in terms of internal structure (table 2). Both Green/EFA and 
GUENGL turn up as most dense, with more than half of possible edges present in each. At the 
other end we find ECR to be more loosely-connected. According to the mean degree values, 
members of the three biggest groups ALDE, EPP and SD are connected to a high number of 
other members. Yet, when taken relative to group size, Green/EFA and GUENGL stand out as 
more cohesive units in which a member is, on average, linked to more than half of the other 
members. Additionally, the average number of edges varies less for Green/EFA and 
GUENGL legislators than for those in other groups (see COV degree). When looking at the 
mean edge weight within groups, Green/EFA and GUENGL are overtaken only by ALDE 
where an edge consists on average of 4.6 instances of asking a question together. Combined 
with the high COV over edge weight, these three groups probably have a rather stable core of 
members asking questions together.  
Table 2: Summary statistics of subgraphs induced by group members 
 ALDE ECR EFD EPP Green/ 
EFA 
GUENGL SD None 
# of nodes 89 42 26 272 60 38 187 11 
# of edges 1652 161 90 11422 1033 400 4121 10 
density 0.422 0.187 0.277 0.310 0.584 0.569 0.237 0.182 
mean degree 

















COV degree  0.499 0.863 0.693 0.520 0.431 0.427 0.670 1.04 
mean edge weight 4.6 1.8 2.6 2.2 3.3 4.4 1.6 1.3 
COV edge weight 1.77 0.37 0.70 1.14 1.39 1.25 0.77 0.37 
degree assortativity -0.108 0.665 0.331 -0.035 -0.046 -0.184 -0.028 -0.533 




The final statistic on aggregate structure is the coefficient of degree assortativity, which varies 
between -1 and 1 and measures how nodes connect in terms of their degree. While a positive 
value indicates that nodes preferably connect to other nodes with a similar degree, creating a 
core-periphery structure, negative values indicate the tendency of high-degree nodes to 
connect to low-degree ones. While most groups do not show a clear tendency to sort along 
these lines, ECR and EFD appear to be positively (i.e. containing a core-periphery-structure), 
and GUENGL somewhat negatively assortative. For the few MEPs unaffiliated with a group, 
the value is probably too unreliable to interpret. 
Figure 5 shows the subgraphs spanned by legislators from the different groups as full 
networks, including all legislators, and as a reduced version in which edges with a weight of 
four or less and isolate nodes have been removed. To facilitate a comparison, the position of 
nodes appearing in both versions is identical. For EFD and ECR only the full networks are 
given since edges among legislators are so weak that the networks degraded completely when 
light edges were discarded. 
In general, all groups have clearly identifiable centers where all nodes are connected directly 
to each other, surrounded by more peripheral regions. The size of these central cliques, in 
which every legislator is connected to every other legislator, varies across parliamentary 
groups (from 62 legislators for EPP down to ten individuals for EFD) and usually degrades 
when lighter edges are ignored, yet, a remaining denser region can nonetheless be identified 
in all plots. Among the groups, Green/EFA, GUENGL and ALDE stand somewhat apart since 
their networks all show a large, well-integrated core in the full version which remains clearly 
discernible when lightweight edges are removed. Nevertheless, all lose a substantial amount 
of nodes, indicating that many legislators were only loosely tied to the group networks. For 
EPP and SD, several more densely connected regions become visible, e.g. a cluster of mostly 
Italian legislators in SD which forms the largest clique at the reduced level of detail (upper 
 
 
left corner of the plot). Similarly, EPP holds a considerably large maximal clique of only 
Italians (upper right corner of the plot), accompanied by two more loosely interconnected 
regions in the left and lower part of the plot. Also, the maximal clique in the ECR subgraph 
consists mostly of Polish legislators, suggesting that within the groups, nationality may be a 










Table 3: Number of edges and average weight running between and within groups 
(upper right triangle and main diagonal); Lower left triangle: Maximum recorded edge 
weight (frequency in brackets). 
 ALDE ECR EFD EPP Green/EFA GUENGL SD none 
Avg. 
Weight: 
In / out 




























































SD 8 (2) 8 (1) 9 (1) 11 (1) 12 (1) 5 (3) 4121 (1.60) 
252 
(1.49) 1.00 
none 4 (1) 2 (6) 3 (1) 4 (3) 3 (8) 3 (2) 3 (6) 10 (1.30) 0.87 
 
Table 3 sheds light on the way in which groups interconnect on an aggregate level. The values 
indicate how many edges run between nodes from different groups, the values in brackets 
show the average weight across the respective edges; the rightmost column indicates the ratio 
of average weight for edges within the group to those pointing outside. As predicted by H1a 
groups usually have stronger edges (higher average edge weights) within than among them (as 
can be seen from comparing diagonal and off-diagonal cells), yet a significant amount of 
cooperation between different groups can also be observed – by far more than is established 
from questioning networks in parliamentary systems (see Metz and Jäckle 2016). This seems 
to confirm H1b. However, although the network is strongly interwoven, most edges among 
groups are not particularly strong. ALDE, Green/EFA, and GUENGL stand out as 
comparatively cohesive units with edges within the group being on average two to three times 
thicker than those pointing to the outside. In contrast, the average edge weights of ECR, SD 
and unaffiliated legislators outside their grouping do not differ much from or are even lower 
than the average weights within. For EFD and EPP the ratios of weights within vs. outside 
 
 
edges are also fairly close to unity but this stems from the fact that both groups have 
comparatively strong edges running between them. Apart from this, there seems to be no 
apparent pattern within the weights that would fit the expectation that ideologically closer 
groups might have more or stronger edges connecting them.  
On a personal level, we find indications that interconnections between groups might partly be 
driven by legislators’ nationality as expected by H2. Inspecting who participates in the 
strongest edges running between pairs of groups, we find several instances in which 
politicians connecting two groups by above average cooperation often or mostly stem from 
the same country although parts of these links may also be explained in terms of ideology. For 
example, EFD and EPP are connected by five edges with a weight of twelve each that run 
from conservative Italian legislators (Salvatore Tatarella (FLI, EPP), Clemente Mastella 
(UDEUR, EPP), Paolo Bartolozzi, Roberta Angelilli and Amalia Sartori (all three PLD, EPP)) 
to Oreste Rossi (Italy, Lega Nord, EFD). Yet, in other cases, strong connections obviously 
ignore ideological boundaries at the national level, for example when German MEP Andreas 
Schwab (CDU, EPP) participates in both the heaviest edge to Greens/EFA (with Heide Rühle, 
Greens; 12 questions) and to SD (with Evelyne Gebhart, SPD; 11 questions). We will return 
to this notion in the next section.  
Structuring properties of the network 
So far, parliamentary groups (and possibly national origin) seem to be the main structuring 
properties of the network, yet other aspects may also play a role for connections among 
legislators. One way to test this idea more formally is to interpret the group or nation as a 
partition of nodes, calculate network modularity for it and subject its value to a randomization 
test to determine its significance (Kirkland 2013, see also Christakis/Fowler 2013). 
Modularity as the most widely used approach to identify group structures in a network is 
defined as the number of ties among members of a class of nodes compared to the number 
 
 
expected by chance (see the appendix for the formula). A modularity value of zero indicates 
that the partition of interests is meaningless as a structural property (i.e. there are as many 
edges in the groups as we would expect by chance), while larger absolute values (modularity 
is strictly below +/-1) indicate that there are either more (positive values) or less (negative 
values) edges than expected, which in turn means that the partition captures a relevant 
structural property of the graph. Once we have calculated a modularity value for a given 
partition, determining its significance is straightforward: keeping the size of groups in the 
partition fixed, we can (for a large number of iterations) randomly assign nodes to the groups 
and re-calculate modularity. If our initial value deviates heavily from the resulting 
distribution, it is significant. Apart from parliamentary group (H1) and country (H2) we also 
tested three other partitions of nodes: formal position during their term (either in a 
parliamentary group or in the parliament itself vs. no position), freshman status in 2009 and 
gender.  
 
Table 4: Modularity simulations 
Partition No. of Edges 
within groups 













Group 18889 30862 2.37 1.64 0.206*** -0.007 0.005 
Country 6364 43387 3.21 1.72 0.119*** -0.006 0.002 
Position 26196 23555 1.88 1.95 0.005 -0.006 0.009 
Freshman 25236 24515 1.91 1.92 0.002 -0.006 0.010 
Gender 26286 23465 1.92 1.90 0.020*** -0.006 0.008 
*** = Observed modularity larger or smaller than 99% of simulated values; based on 2000 
permutations. 
 
Table 4 presents both the number of edges within and across the five partitions for our 
network plus their mean weight. While no clear structure appears in the number of edges, both 
parliamentary group and native country clearly stand out with the mean weight being 
considerably higher within than between groups. For the other three attributes, differences are 
 
 
minimal. Calculating modularity yields high values for group (0.206), native country (0.119) 
and (although smaller by an order of magnitude) for gender (0.020), while values for formal 
position and freshman status are close to zero. To get a better hold of the meaning of the 
coefficients, we simulated 2000 networks (separately for each partition) in which we 
randomly distributed the attribute of interest across the network keeping the size of groups 
constant (technically we reshuffled node attributes) and recorded the respective modularity 
statistic. The resulting 99% confidence intervals indicate that both parliamentary group and 
native country are highly significant as structural patterns in the network. Also, while the 
value for gender is much smaller it is still clearly significant, showing that women and men 
prefer to connect among themselves. Formal position and freshman status play no role. 
Table 5: Simulation of cohesion among parliamentary groups 










































































































none        1.30 
(1.00; 6.51) 
(1.00; 4,14) 
Confidence intervals in brackets (upper brackets: 99%, lower brackets: 95%). Dark shading: 
Edge weight significantly exceeds expected weight; light shading: Edge weight significantly 
below expected weight. Based on 1000 permutations. 
 
Using a similar logic but employing edge weight instead of modularity as the statistic of 
interest, we additionally simulated 1000 permuted networks to investigate both whether 
 
 
parliamentary groups and countries of origin vary significantly in terms of their cohesion and 
connectivity. Both results are captured as the average edge weight between legislators of the 
same/of two different group(s) and legislators from similar/different countries. Table 5 
presents the results for groups:  ALDE, Green/EFA, GUENGL and EPP are clearly more 
cohesive groups as their average edge weight strongly exceeds what can be expected by 
chance (see main diagonal). In contrast, the mean weight for SD is even below the null-model 
distribution, indicating that SD-legislators support each other less often than we would expect 
by mere chance. The remainder of the matrix includes the connectivity measures. We find that 
only EPP and EFD legislators are more securely connected (= mutual attraction) than we 
would expect by chance. Apart from that, all departures from randomness suggest repulsion 
among groups.  
 
 
Figure 6: Simulation of cohesion among legislators from specific countries
 
The results for the countries are too large for a table and instead captured in figure 6 as a 
network in which edges represent the relation between two countries. For easy interpretation, 
we omitted isolated countries and only retained average edge weights which were 
significantly above (= mutual attraction) or below (= repulsion) the null-model. Only for Italy 
(above chance level) and Spain (below) does cohesion differ significantly from randomness, 
for all others, legislators from the same country maintain on average no stronger edges among 
themselves than might be expected by chance. Regarding connectivity, the network has a 
region in the lower right corner, which mostly consists of Central and Eastern European 
countries connected by negative edges with Poland and Hungary as the two most repulsive 
countries. Their delegates pose questions together with legislators from their neighbors in the 
 
 
network (e.g. Germany, France) less often. On the other hand, we find legislators from several 
Western European countries (Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, the 
UK, and Malta) posing questions together more often than we would expect by chance. While 
these results might suggest more cooperation among legislators from countries which have 
been in the EU for longer, one has to be careful not to overstretch the idea: most edges are 
fairly close to the boundary of the confidence interval which suggests that the effects are not 
particularly extreme. This fits the idea that countries show up mostly in somewhat reduced 
cooperation rather than in legislators sticking together along national lines. Nations play a role 
as structuring principle, but it is clearly weaker than that of the parliamentary groups. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this article we have explored the connections among members of the European Parliament 
during the term of 2009-2014 using jointly asked OQs as the basis for a network analysis. Our 
results show that OQs indeed provide interesting information about the internal structure of 
the parliament that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. Regarding this structure we find 
that groups differ quite substantially in the frequency of questions and the fraction of 
individual legislators supporting one. Also, most legislators are only marginally involved in 
the business of asking questions with many just supporting one or two questions viz-a-viz a 
small group of individuals that is highly active. As expected in H1a, the network shows the 
central role of parliamentary groups. Generally speaking, legislators from one and the same 
group have more connections to their own fellow group members than to other legislators, and 
they have stronger edges – i.e. they issue more OQs together. Furthermore, simulation-based 
permutation tests show (1) that the parliamentary group is clearly the most important 
structuring principle of the OQ-network and (2) that some groups are more cohesive in terms 
of edge weights than others. Particularly ALDE, Green/EFA, and GUENGL are cohesive, 
while SD is internally rather loosely connected. Also, groups seem to shun each other in 
 
 
general, as indicated by average edge weights below what would be expected by chance. The 
only exception was a positive attraction between EFD and EPP. Yet, as it has been formulated 
in H1b in contrast to questions in parliamentary systems such as Germany (see Metz/Jäckle 
2016), in the EU parliament there is still a significant amount of cooperation between 
parliamentary groups when posing OQs – i.e. crossing party lines is definitely an option. In 
hypothesis H2 we expected that MEPs from the same country issue more questions together 
than with colleagues from other countries. This is indeed the case. The second most important 
clustering characteristic next to parliamentary group is a legislators’ native country. 
Legislators from different countries often cooperate a little less than we may attribute to 
chance (especially if they come from Central or Eastern Europe), while the mean edge 
weights between legislators from several pairs of Western European countries were above 
what the null-model predicted. Overall, signs of repulsive forces based on nation and group 
seem to exist, although they are rather small. Attraction, on the other hand, is visible both 
more clearly and more strongly based on parliamentary groups (and less on countries). 
Given that parliamentary questions are a primary means of executive oversight, our results 
also address the question of how control of the Council and Commission is implemented at 
the aggregate level. That the network spans the whole parliament suggests that the function 
does not follow “parliamentary” terms of government and opposition but is rather reminiscent 
of the US model. Furthermore, the prominent role of groups vis-à-vis nations suggests that it 
is primarily driven by ideological considerations although Western European countries might 
have a tendency to cast oversight in slightly different terms.  
While our study has discovered several interesting pieces of evidence concerning the 
interrelation of members of the European Parliament, it is only the beginning. Several 
directions are worthwhile exploring: first, regarding the nature of connections, classifying 
questions according to their content would not only yield leverage to separate specialists from 
 
 
generalists but also to more clearly spell out how control and oversight as a parliamentary 
function is subject to a division of labor and how this division is organized. Second, 
comparing our result for OQs with networks derived from written questions may be especially 
informative in light of Rasch’s (2011) observation that different types of questions exert 
different attractions on front- and backbenchers. And finally, networks derived from questions 
could also be compared to those from cosponsoring (at least in legislatures where both is 
possible). This could lead to a clarification of the different ways parliamentary work is 
structured depending on the diverse functions of parliaments (e.g. control and legislative 
activities) and tell to what extent and in which concrete cases networks derived from OQs, 
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�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖� with m number of edges, Aij 
denoting the element in row i, column j of the adjacency matrix A, ki and kj denoting the 
degree of nodes i and j, respectively, ci and cj the type of nodes i and j, and δ(x, y) standing 
for the Kronecker delta which is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. 
 
